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Relationship between Design Elements and Performance in Online 
Innovation Contests: Contest Sequence is Moderator? 
Liwei Wang1, Jian Tian1*, Yi Xu1 
1School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, CHINA 
 
Abstract: As an important issue in the field of innovation contest, performance of innovation contest has been attracting the 
attention of both academics and practioners over recent years. This paper explores the factors influencing performance of 
online innovation contest from the design elements perspective. The study is based on the empirical research of the online 
innovation contest community - studio.Topcoder.com. We find the longer the contest duration, the higher contest 
performance in the one-stage contest. The results also show that too much detailed task description will reduce the 
performance of the one-stage contests, but will increase the number of solvers in the two-stage contests. The results also 
reveal that the incentive effect of first prize in the one-stage contests is stronger than that in the two-stage contests, while the 
incentive effect of second prize in the two-stage contests is stronger than that in the one-stage contests, and if the amount of 
second prize is close to the prize amount, the number of solvers and eligible solutions will raise. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult for companies who depend on the internal innovation to response to the rapid changes of 
demand, and more and more companies convert to the online communities to solve the innovation difficulties by 
the means of contest (Piller & Walcher, 2006; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010)[1,2]. This emerging open innovation 
mode is called "online innovation contest" or "crowdsourcing contest" (Brabham, 2008; Poetz & Schreier, 
2012)[3,4]. Innovation contest means companies release the innovation tasks through online communities (e.g., 
InnoCentive.com, and Topcoder.com), the solvers use their skills, experience and creativity to provide the 
solutions for specific tasks and the winner will obtain the contest reward(Bullinger et al., 2010)[5]. 
How to maximize the outcomes and performance of innovation contest is a long-standing question for 
researchers and seekers(Adamczyk, 2012; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008)[6,7]. To solve this problem, lots of previous 
studies pay more attention to the design of the number of constants (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008; Boudreau, Lacetera, 
& Lakhani, 2011; Che & Gale, 2003)[7,8,9], award amount ( Archak, 2010; Giebe 2014 )[10,11]and award structure 
(Cason, Masters, & Sheremeta, 2010; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008)[7,12]from the economic perspective by the 
economic model or secondary data collected from the online contest platforms. Prior studies also put forward 
many valuable implications on how to optimize the design elements of innovation contest by empirical research 
(Shao et al., 2012; Yang, 2012)[13,14]. In their papers, the impact of different elements such as duration of contest, 
task description and incentives mechanism on the quantity of solvers and solutions has been discussed. A longer 
period can attract more solvers, while too long task description will reduce the quantity of solvers(Yang, Chen, 
& Pavlou, 2009)[15]. Although contest bonus can encourage the solvers to participate in the contests (Terwiesch 
& Xu, 2008; Giebe, 2014; Yang, 2012; Yang et al., 2009)[7,11,14,15], it is dilemma how to choose the optimal 
incentive mechanism. In the context of traditional contest theory, the organizers will choose winner-take-all 
mechanism when the competitors are risk neutral and the cost function is linear or concave (Moldovanu & Sela, 
2001; Sheremeta, 2011)[16,17]. But in the context of online contest, winner-take-all is optimal for the creative or 
trial and error projects while multi-award will be more effective for expertise projects ( Terwiesch & Xu, 
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2008)[7]. When the solvers are risk aversion, the organizers will choose to set up multiple awards, instead of 
winner-take-all (Archak & Sundararajan, 2009)[18]. An experimental evidence was given that multi-award is 
better than winner-take-all for competitors (Cason et al., 2010)[12]. Further research showed the second prize 
could enhance the solvers’ efforts and the balance of contest when there are three competitors or more 
(Szymanski & Valletti, 2005)[19]. In addition, traditional contest theories indicate that different sequence, single 
stage or multi-stage, has a significant impact on contest performance (Moldovanu & Sela, 2006; Fu & Lu, 
2012)[16,20]. However, most of the existing researches focus on the impact of design elements on the performance 
in single stage innovation contests (Shao et al., 2012; Yang, 2012; Yang, et al., 2009)[13,14,15], and few about 
two-stage innovation contests. To address above-mentioned gaps, this paper tries to develop a research model to 
empirical study the influencing factors of performance from the viewpoint of design elements and identify the 
moderating effect of contest sequence on the relationship between design elements and performance.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives the related hypotheses with regard to 
relations between contest elements and performance of online innovation contest and considers the moderating 
effect of contest sequence. In section 3, we present the research method and collect the data which are used in 
section 4 to verify the hypotheses. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes the paper and points to 
future work. 
 
2. RELATED HYPOTHESES 
Contest is a well-established and increasingly popular mechanism for facilitating innovation (Terwiesch & 
Xu, 2008; Boudreau et al., 2011; Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009)[7,8,21]. Prior studies on traditional contests indicate 
that increasing the number of competitors will make the competitors reduce their effort and lower overall 
outcomes of contests, thereby scholars suggest sponsors should restrict the size of contests(Che & Gale, 2003)[9]. 
However, studies on innovation contests argue that open innovation contests to everybody will be more 
conducive to seekers (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008; Boudreau, et al., 2011)[7,8]. Because seekers can get different and 
various solutions from solvers in free-entry contests, and the benefits of diversity can mitigate the negative 
effect of solvers’ underinvestment (Bayus, 2013; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008)[7,22]. Moreover, adding competitors in 
an innovation contest can increase the probability that find an extreme-value solution and enhance overall 
performance for high-uncertainty contest problems(Boudreau, et al., 2011)[8]. In addition, free-entry contests as 
a powerful tool to aggregate the efforts of the crowd (collective intelligence) are used to facilitate the generation 
and evaluation of innovative solutions (Yang, 2012; Lüttgens et al., 2014)[14,23]. Thus, the tendency of 
innovation contest is open to all external comers rather than restrict entry (Boudreau et al., 2011)[8]. Most of 
online innovation contests are free entry to all external solvers. If the contest bonus is fixed and the degree of 
contest sponsors’ feedback is high enough, the number of solvers directly reflects the performance of online 
innovation contest(Yang, 2012)[14]. In addition, the performance also depends on the effort of solvers, which 
mean the quantity and quality of the final submissions (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008; Liu & Lu, 2014)[7,24].Then, this 
paper will analyze the impact of these factors on the number of solvers and the quantity of eligible submissions. 
2.1 Relationship between contest duration and performance 
The duration of contest refers to the length of time defined by the contest organizers to complete the task. 
Because the external solvers can enter the contest at any time, the length of duration will affect the number of 
entries. The longer contest duration can make more solvers to enter the contest (Yang, 2012)[14]. In addition, the 
inputs of online innovators mainly depend on their spare time and whether the innovators can win the contest 
have a significant positive correlation with their spent spare time (Lakhani et al., 2007)[25]. Thus, the longer the 
contest duration is, the more free time the competitors can spend and the higher the likelihood of participation 
and completion is. This discussion is summarized in the following hypotheses. 
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H1a: Contest duration has a positive effect on the number of competitors. 
H1b: Contest duration has a positive effect on the quantity of eligible submissions. 
2.2 Relationship between task description and performance 
Task description refers to the specific requirements defined by the organizers for the solutions submitted by 
the solvers, reflecting the degree of certainty about the innovation issues. The length of task description 
approximately describes information quality. The longer the task description is, the higher the requirement for 
the accuracy of submitted information. The longer the task description and the more requirement or restriction 
for the solvers, the higher the learning cost for solvers are, which will lead to the decrease in the number of 
solvers (Yang et al., 2009)[15]. Thus, the following hypotheses are offered.  
H2a: Task description has a negative effect on the number of solvers. 
H2b: Task description has a negative effect on the quantity of eligible submissions 
2.3 Relationship between award setting and performance 
Winning the bonus is one of the main motivations for the participants to enter the online innovation 
contests (Brabham, 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Sun, Fang, & Lim, 2012)[26,27,28]. The higher the bonus is, the more 
participants involved in contest are (Sun et al., 2012; Yang, 2012)[14,28]. Especially for the creative contest task, 
the number of participants is logarithmic as the bonus increase (DiPalantino & Vojnovic, 2009)[29]. In general, 
the organizer will set first prize higher than second prize to seek more desirable solution. However, the higher 
contest bonus often requires more effort, so it will be almost impossible for those who are lack of knowledge 
accumulation or free time to complete the task. Thus, those solvers prefer second prize to first prize. The 
following hypotheses summarize these arguments. 
H3a: First prize and second prize have a negative effect on the number of competitors. 
H3b: First prize has a negative effect on the quantity of eligible submissions, but the second prize has a 
positive effect on the quantity of eligible submissions. 
2.4 Moderating effect of contest sequence 
Generally, the duration of single stage contest is shorter than that of two-stage contest. So solvers will 
devote more time to fulfilling the task in single stage contest. If the duration in single stage contest becomes 
longer, more solvers who are limited in free time but can provide valuable ideas will be motivated to participate 
in the contest and final eligible submissions will increase. Too long task description may reduce the 
performance of single stage contest because the solvers who are lack of knowledge accumulation or free time 
will drop out or even not participate due to high cost and the low possibility of completing the task. But in 
two-stage contest, the solvers can employ much more free time and it will weaken the negative effect of long 
task description on completing the task. This discussion is summarized in the following hypotheses. 
H4a: Contest sequence plays a moderator role in the relations between contest duration and the number of 
solvers. With the extension of contest duration, the increasing trend of solvers in single stage contest is more 
significant than that in two-stage contest. 
H4b: Contest sequence plays a moderator role in the relations between contest duration and the number of 
eligible submissions. With the extension of contest duration, the increasing trend of eligible submissions in 
single stage contest is more significant than that in two-stage contest. 
H5a: Contest sequence plays a moderator role in the relations between task description and the number of 
solvers. With the increase of task description, the decreasing trend of eligible submissions in single stage 
contest is more significant than that in two-stage contest. 
H5b: Contest sequence plays a moderator role in the relations between task description and the number of 
eligible submissions. With the increase of task description, the decreasing trend of eligible submissions in single 
stage contest is more significant than that in two-stage contest. 
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Given a two-stage contest, in the first round the organizer expect to attain a set of solutions and then 
provide feedback to solvers to improve the quality of the final solution and reduce the risk; in the second round 
the solvers would update their previous solutions. So the solvers participate in the second stage is not limited to 
the results of the first stage, and they can also win the prize if the solvers can provide the eligible solution. 
Because the organizers will select some eligible solutions, the probability that the selected solvers win the first 
prize in the second round will be large and most of those who have not been selected would prefer the second 
prize. But in single stage contest, information of each solver is always private, so they prefer to try their best to 
win the first prize. This discussion is summarized in the following hypotheses. 
H6a: Contest sequence plays a moderator role in the relations between the first prize, the second prize and 
the number of solvers. The first prize’s incentive effect on the solvers is stronger in the single stage than that in 
the multistage contest while the second prize’s incentive effect on the solvers is weaker in the single stage than 
that in the multistage contest.  
H6b: Contest sequence plays a moderator role in the relations between the first prize, the second prize and 
the number of eligible submissions. The first prize’s negative effect on the number of eligible submissions is 
weaker in the single stage than that in the multistage contest while the second prize’s positive effect on the 
number of eligible submissions is stronger in the single stage than that in the multistage contest. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Data collection 
We select a famous online innovation community-Topcoder.com creative studio (studio.topcoder.com) to 
gather data and verify hypothesis in our research. The creative design contest tasks of Topcoder include logo 
design, print design, web application design, icon design, and wireframe design and so on. The total number of 
tasks has been completed up to 1770 in early June 2013 and 1572 of them are valid. This paper collected 823 
from the 1572 tasks happened from August of 2008 to May of 2013, including 397 single-stage contests and 426 
two stage contests. 
Table1. Types of Innovation Contest Project in Survey Sample. 
Project Types Frequencies % 
Logo Design 77 9.4 
Print/Presentation 101 12.3 
Web Design 292 35.5 
Application Front-End Design 60 7.3 
Banners/Icons 88 10.7 
Wireframes 167 20.3 
Idea Generation 11 1.3 
Widget or Mobile Screen Design 27 3.3 
Total 823 100.0 
 
3.2 Variables measuring 
We refer to the approaches of the measurement of variables in previous research (Shao et al., 2012; Yang, 
2012; Yang et al., 2009)[13,14,15], and make necessary amendments in accordance with the contents of this paper. 
The dependent variables in this paper are as follows: Number of Solvers (NS): measured by the actual number 
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of participants in each contest; Number of Eligible Submissions (NES): measured by the quantity of qualified 
plans submitted by selected participants. The independent variables include Contest Duration (CD): measured 
by task deadline time minus start time; Task Description (TD): collect the descriptive information about the task 
requirements of each contest in Topcoder, and then extract the information of effective character description 
using Excel; Amount of First Prize(FP), Second Prize(SP) and Total Bonus(TB): measured by the amount of the 
reward provided by Topcoder.com; and Ratio of Two Prizes (RTP): measured by the ratio of the second prize 
and first prize, the ratio is closer to 1, indicating that the second prize is closer to the first prize. We assume that 
the Contest Sequence (CS) as the moderator in our paper. In Topcoder, the solvers just submit one idea or plan 
in a single stage of the contest to win the prize; However in a two-stage contest, the solvers must submit a draft 
of ideas or programs in the first stage and they need to submit final specific proposals or ideas in the second 
stage. A dummy variable D  is introduced to encode, 0=D means "one-stage contest" and 1=D  means 
"two-stage contest."  
In addition to the above factors, the performance of contest may also be affected by market factors (Shao et 
al., 2012; Yang, 2012)[13,14]. On the basis of reference, Competition Intensity (CI): measured by the number of 
the same type contest in the same contest duration; and Market Price (MP): measured by the average contest 
prize of the same type contest which is being carried out or over in the front or during the contest in the 
community are regarded as the control variables. 
3.3 Research Method and Model Estimation 
A moderated multiple regression (MMR) method is used in this paper to examine whether contest sequence 
has moderating effect on the relationship between design elements and performance of innovation contests. In 
addition, in order to reflect the elasticity impact of the explanatory variables on the dependent variables and 
eliminate the effects of heteroscedasticity, all continuous dependent variable and independent variables are 
calculated by log-transformed, and then analyzed using least squares regression. Taking into account the 
multicollinearity between the variables, in the next regression analysis, we will place the first and second prizes 
in a group regression, and place the total prize and bonus distribution ratio into another set of regression in this 
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4. RESULTS 
Descriptive statistical results are listed in Table2, including the mean, standard deviation and coefficient of 
correlation. Regression analysis results are shown in table 3. Through the multicollinearity inspection, we found 
that the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of the first prize and second prize are less than 5, and the VIF of the 
other independent variables are less than 2.Thus, there are no serious multicollinearity problems in multiple 
regression models. From table2, model 1 and model 5 analysis results show that competition intensity and 
market price have negative significant effect on the number of solvers( ciβ =-0.07,p<0.01; mpβ =-0.34,p<0.001) 
and the number of eligible submissions ( ciβ =-0.09,p<0.01; mpβ =-0.51,p<0.001).  It revealed that if the 
sponsors conducting innovation contest in large competition intensity, they may get lower innovation contest 
performance, and if amount of prize is lower than the market price also will lead to performance drop. 
4.1 The Influence of the Design Elements 
From Table3, the results of model1 and model 5 show that, contest duration has a positive significant effect 
on the number of solvers ( cdβ =0.30, p<0.001) and the number of eligible submissions ( cdβ =0.16, p<0.01), 
H1a and H1b were supported. However, task description does not exist negative significant effect on the number 
of solvers ( tdβ =0.05), hypothesis 2a wasn’t stand. But task description has a negative significant influence on 
the number of eligible submissions ( tdβ =-0.39, p<0.001), supporting H2b. In addition, the results of model1 
show that second prize has a positive significant influence on the number of solvers ( spβ =0.09, p<0.05), but 
first prize has no significant influence on the number of solvers ( fpβ =-0.04), H3a was part supported. The 
results of model5 show that first prize has a negative significant influence on the number of eligible submissions 
( fpβ =-0.44, p<0.001), but second prize has a positive significant influence on the number of eligible 
submissions ( spβ =0.24, p<0.01), H3b was supported. From the regression results of model 3 and model 7, we 
further find that if the proportion of the second prize bonus get greater, the number of solvers ( rateβ =0.08, 
p<0.1) and eligible submissions ( rateβ =0.29, p<0.001) will be increased. 
4.2 The Moderating Effect of Contest Sequence 
From table3, the MMR analysis results of model2 and model6 show contest sequence plays a significant 
moderator role in the relations between contest duration and the number of solvers( cdcs×β =-0.04, p<0.05), and 
the relations between contest duration and the number of eligible submissions( cdcs×β =-0.06, p<0.1). From 
Figure1, we find that with the extension of contest duration, the number of solvers and eligible submissions in 
one-stage contest has a more significantly increasing than in two-stage contest, H4a and 4b were supported. 
Moreover, contest sequence also plays a significant moderator role in the relations between task description and 
the number of solvers ( cdcs×β =0.06, p<0.05), and eligible submissions ( cdcs×β =0.08, p<0.05). From Figure2, 
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with the increasing of task descriptive，the number of solvers increase in one-stage contest, but decrease in 
two-stage contest, moreover, the number of eligible submission fall more intense in one-stage contest than 
two-stage contest, H5a and H5b were supported. 
The results of model2 and model6 show that contest sequence plays a significant moderator role in the 
relations of the first prize, the second prize and the number of solvers ( fpcs×β =-0.07, p<0.05; spcs×β =0.09, 
p<0.01). Contest sequence also plays a significant moderator role in the relations of the first prize, the second 
prize and the number of eligible submissions ( fpcs×β =-0.11, p<0.1; spcs×β =0.09, p<0.1). Figure3 shows with 
the increase of amount of the first prize, the number of solvers participating in one-stage contest is more than in 
two-stage contest, and the number of eligible submissions in one-stage contest is more than in two-stage contest, 
H6a was supported. From Figure4, with the rising of amount of the second prize, the number of solvers and 
eligible submissions have significant increase in one-stage contest, but the number of solvers dropped in 
two-stage contest, the number of eligible submissions shows a straight line, H6b was supported. From Figure5, 
we further find with the proportion of second prize increasing, the number of solvers and eligible submissions 
are significantly increased. 
 
 Table2. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations of the Variables a. 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Competition Intensity 3.78 3.55           
2. Market Price 1108. 467.6 0.55          
3. Contest Duration 6.77 3.91 0.43 0.36         
4. Task Description 6527. 1775. 0.24 0.34 0.26        
5. Total Prize 1258. 701.0 0.42 0.63 0.55 0.48       
6. Amount of First Prize 833.8 445.2 0.36 0.58 0.48 0.41 0.96      
7. Amount of Second 249.4 139.9 0.31 0.51 0.43 0.38 0.87 0.83     
8. Rate of Two Prizes 0.31 0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 -0.25 0.25    
9. Contest Sequence 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.56 0.48 0.62 0.46 0.41 -0.11   
10. Number of Solvers 21.7 11.41 -0.17 -0.33 0.25 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.07 -0.11  
11. Number of Eligible 14.09 13.45 -0.21 -0.36 0.06 -0.16 -0.24 -0.28 -0.20 0.13 -0.06 0.65 
a n=823; all correlations larger than 0.07 are significant at p<0.05. 
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Table3. Results of Regression Analysisb. 
 Dependent Variables 
 Number of Solvers Number of Eligible Submissions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Controls  
Constant  4.18***   4.25***  4.17***   4.11***       10.69***      10.78*** 
Competition Intensity – 0.07** – 0.08* – 0.07** – 0.08** – 0.09* – 0.10* – 0.09* – 0.09*
Market Price – 0.34***  – 0.31*** – 0.35*** – 0.31*** – 0.51*** – 0.47***  – 0.53*** – 0.48***
Independent Variables 
Contest Duration     0.29**  0.30*** 0.28*** 0.16** 0.14** 0.15** 0.12*
Task Description 0.05  0.01 0.05 0.01+ – 0.39*** – 0.45*** – 0.40***  – 0.46*** 
Amount of First Prize – 0.04 – 0.05   – 0.44*** – 0.47***   
Amount of Second Prize  0.09*   0.13** 0.24** 0.28**  
Total bonus    0.07*  0.10**   – 0.18**  – 0.17** 
Rate of Two Prizes    0.08+  0.11*    0.29***  0.33*** 
Contest Sequence – 0.05 – 0.05 – 0.07 – 0.08* 0.66*** 0.67***  0.70*** 0.71***
Interactions 
Contest Sequence×Contest Duration  – 0.04*  – 0.04*  – 0.06+  – 0.07* 
Contest Sequence×Task Description   0.06*  0.06**   0.08**   0.08** 
Contest Sequence×Amount of  
First Prize 
 – 0.07*    – 0.11+   
Contest Sequence×Amount of  
Second Prize 
  0.09**    0.09+   
Contest Sequence×Total bonus    0.03    0.00 
Contest Sequence×Rateof Two Prizes   0.04**   0.05+
2R  0.28 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.25 
F 44.47***  31.28***  44.84***  31.70***  36.97***  25.19***   36.46***  24.91***
2RΔ     0.02***     0.02***   0.02**     0.01** 
b n=823;*** p<0.001; ** p <0.01 ; * p <0.05;  + p <0.1. 
 
 
Figure1. Interactive effects of contest sequence on contest duration, the number of solvers and eligible submissions. 
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Figure5. Interactive effects of contest sequence on rate of two prizes and the number of solvers and eligible 
submissions. 
 
5. DISCUSSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study empirically analyzes the factors affecting the performance of online innovation contest from the 
perspective of design elements. In this study, we also deeply discuss the mechanism of design elements on 
innovation contest performance under different contest sequences. Analyzing detailed data from 823 innovation 
contests, we find the following conclusions: 
(1) The longer the contest duration, the higher contest performance in the one-stage contest than that in the 
two-stage contest. Prior studies (Shao et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2009)[13,15]only indicate a positive correlation 
between the length of contest duration and the contest performance. However, in this paper, the analysis results 
show that with the extension of contest period, the number of solvers and eligible submissions are significantly 
increased in the one-stage contest, but the growth trend of the number of solvers is weak and the number of 
eligible submissions is falling. This is because that the contest duration of single stage is relatively short 
(average 4.5 days) and extending it can help solvers whose spare time is insufficient to participate in the contest 
and complete the task, however the contest duration of the two-stage is relatively long (average 8.9 days), the 
effect of extending the contest duration on the promotion of competition performance is not significant, on the 
contrary, some solvers might give up halfway because competition time is too long and the cost input is too 
high. 
(2) Too much detailed task description will reduce the performance of the one-stage contests, while attract 
more solvers in the two-stage contests. Previous research was just pointed out that too much description can 
reduce the contest performance (Shao et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2009)[13,15], but does not take the influence of 
different race sequence into account. This paper found that different task descriptions have different influence 
on the innovation contest performance under different competition sequences. It indicates that, the contest 
duration of single stage is relatively short and the solvers are limited by their free time more obviously. The 
longer the task description, the higher demands of the detailed and accuracy level about the submissions. These 
cause the solvers with insufficient spare time give up to participate in or quit halfway which is because the 
opportunity cost is too high, thereby reducing the performance of the whole innovation contest. The contest 
duration of the two-stage is relatively longer, the solvers have relatively enough time to complete the race tasks. 
The task description is more detailed so that the solvers can grasp the requirements of the organizers about the 
final submissions more accurately, so as to have more confidence to win, therefore, the participation enthusiasm 
of the solvers are higher. 
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(3) The effect of the first prize incentive for the solvers in the single stage is stronger than that in the 
two-stage; as for the second prize, the conclusion is opposite, and if the amount of the two prizes is more close, 
the number of solvers and eligible submissions is larger. Prior literatures using the game model noted that the 
effect of incentive and the contest performance of the second prize is always less than that of the first prize 
(DiPalantino & Vojnovic, 2009; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008)[7,29]. But in this paper, the empirical results show that 
the incentive effect of the first prize for the solvers is only significant in the single stage contest but not in the 
two-stage contest. Although the incentive effect of second prize is smaller than that of the first prize in a single 
stage contest but is larger in the two-stage contests, and if the second prize is more close to the first prize, the 
incentive effect of solvers participate in and complete the task is greater. Thus it can be seen, adopting the 
winner-take-all reward mechanism is optimal in a single stage contest, however multi-awards mechanism can 
improve the whole performance in the multi-stage contests. 
The conclusions above sends us the message that, in practice, to improve the performance of online 
innovation contests can be considered from the following aspects: organizers descript the task abstract for the 
innovation problem with high degree of uncertainty which can leave large creative space for the solvers, so the 
organizers can consider to choose a single stage competition sequence and adopt the winner-take-all reward 
mechanism to attract high level solvers to participate in the contest and make more solvers submit solutions by 
setting a longer contest duration. Organizers descript the task specific for the innovation problem with high 
degree of certainty so that organizers can consider choosing multi-stage competition sequence and multiple 
awards in order to attract more solvers to participate in the contest and submit the plan. 
 
6. LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The aim of this article is to conduct the empirical study about the impact of online innovation contest’s 
design elements on the performance of innovation contest, and analyzes different contest sequences’ effects on 
influence factors of innovation contest’s performance and explores effective mechanisms in online innovation 
environment, providing a basis for the applications of online innovation contest and the design of effective 
contest mechanisms. However, the shortage of this paper is that this is mainly involved in creative projects not 
refer to the professional knowledge and trial and error projects, so we can study the effect factors of different 
types of innovation contest projects on performance. In addition, this paper only analyzes the problems from the 
angle of competition design elements, if further research can be combined with the characteristics of the 
solvers(such as risk appetite) to analyze the effect of elements on the performance of innovation contest, the 
accuracy of the research conclusion will be higher. 
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